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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
BRADLEY ARMSTRONG,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 44929
MINIDOKA COUNTY NO. CR 2016-154

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Bradley Armstrong was sentenced to a unified term of ten years, with six years fixed,
after he pled guilty to felony driving under the influence (DUI). He contends the district court
abused its discretion when it imposed this sentence upon him considering, most importantly, the
nature of his offense and the fact that the State recommended a significantly shorter sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 16, 2016, Mr. Armstrong was stopped while driving a vehicle at an excessive
rate of speed, without a valid driver’s license, and with an open can of beer in his vehicle.
(R., pp.12-16; Presentence Investigation Report (PSI), p.4.)
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His breath alcohol level was

measured at .164, .143, and .146 and he was arrested for DUI. (R., pp.12-16.) Mr. Armstrong
was charged by Information with felony DUI, driving without privileges, and possession of an
open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle. (R., pp.28-31.) He was charged by Information
Part II with having two prior DUI convictions within ten years. (R., pp.32-34.) Mr. Armstrong
entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to felony
DUI, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and recommend a unified sentence of
six years, with three years fixed, and with a period of retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.42, 45-47)
Mr. Armstrong pled guilty and the district court accepted his plea. (R., p.43.) The district court
sentenced Mr. Armstrong to a unified term of ten years, with six years fixed, and with a period of
retained jurisdiction. (R., p.59.) The judgment of conviction and order retaining jurisdiction was
entered on June 6, 2016. (R., pp.60-63.)
On July 29, 2016, Mr. Armstrong filed a motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35
(“Rule 35”) to reconsider sentence. (R., pp.68-69.) The district court denied the motion without
a hearing. (R., pp.70-74.) Mr. Armstrong successfully completed a rider and the North Idaho
Correctional Institution (NICI) recommended that the district court place Mr. Armstrong on
probation. (PSI, pp.99-107.) Following a hearing, the district court suspended Mr. Armstrong’s
sentence and placed him on probation for a period of ten years. (R., pp.75-76.) The order
granting probation was entered on January 30, 2017. (R., pp.77-79.) Mr. Armstrong filed a
timely Notice of Appeal on March 13, 2017. (R., pp.80-82.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Armstrong to a unified term of
ten years, with six years fixed, for felony DUI?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Armstrong To A Unified Term
Of Ten Years, With Six Years Fixed, For Felony DUI
Mr. Armstrong asserts that, given any view of the facts, his underlying unified sentence
of ten years, with six years fixed, was excessive. Where, as here, the sentence imposed by the
district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is
a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting State v.
Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)). “When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing,
‘the most fundamental requirement is reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho
606, 608 (1991)). “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary
objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation or retribution.” Id. (citation omitted). “When reviewing the reasonableness of a
sentence this Court will make an independent examination of the record, ‘having regard to the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.’” Id.
(quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).
The sentence imposed upon Mr. Armstrong was not reasonable considering, most
importantly, the nature of his offense and the fact that the State recommended a significantly
shorter sentence. Mr. Armstrong was stopped for driving over the speed limit, but it does not
appear that he presented a significant danger to himself, other drivers, or the officer who stopped
his vehicle. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Armstrong was not violent or disrespectful to the officer in any way.
(PSI, p.3.) He admitted drinking alcohol, attempted to complete the field sobriety tests, and took
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a breath alcohol test, which determined his breath alcohol level was above the legal limit. (PSI,
p.3.) Mr. Armstrong was employed as an operator/laborer prior to being arrested for the instant
offense, and hopes to be able to return to this employer as soon as possible. (PSI, pp.12-13,
105.)
Mr. Armstrong was 44 years old at the time of the instant offense, and has been
struggling with alcohol addiction since he began drinking at age 14. (PSI, pp.15, 19.) He has
participated in alcohol treatment in the past, and recognizes he has to stop drinking. (PSI, pp.15,
16.) To complicate matters, Mr. Armstrong also struggles with mental illness and has been
diagnosed with depression, anxiety, PTSD, and panic issues. (PSI, p.14.) He also has a history
of suicide ideation and attempts. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Armstrong has been admitted for inpatient
mental health treatment on four occasions—most recently, in 2016. (PSI, p.14.) During the
presentence investigation, Mr. Armstrong identified the most important thing in his life as his 15year-old daughter, and stated he would like to restore his relationship with her. (PSI, pp.17, 20.)
The presentence investigator recommended high intensity residential treatment, and it is
clear such treatment is necessary. (PSI, p.18.) What is not necessary is a lengthy term of
incarceration. The prosecutor recommended a unified sentence of six years, with three years
fixed, and a period of retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.5, Ls.18-21.) This would have been a
reasonable sentence, in light of Mr. Armstrong’s character and the need to protect the public
interest. Considering the mitigating factors that exist in this case, and notwithstanding the
aggravating factors, the district court abused its discretion when it did not follow this
recommendation, and instead sentenced Mr. Armstrong to a unified term of ten years (the
maximum) with six years fixed.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Armstrong respectfully requests that the Court reduce his underlying sentence as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that the Court vacate his underlying sentence and
remand this case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 31st day of July, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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